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KANT'S SYSTEM OF TRANSCENDENTALISM.

By A. E. KROEGER.

I.

In our days the word Philosophy has ceased to have the meaning attached to it in the last century, as the name of an in-itself absolutely closed Science of Pure Reason, or Science of Knowledge. It is now again held to signify merely a more or less connected argumentation on any kind of matters and things, and embraces almost any class of writings wherein but the shadow of argument presents itself. Philosophy is no longer conceived to be a science of *a priori* universal principles; but the crudest individual reflections of men like Herbert Spencer and Stuart Mill are classified under its name. Any author who collects the notions that may chance to run through his brain, or even those that have run through the brains of others, is now-a-days called a Philosopher. The sacred importance connected with that word in the times of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Kant, and Fichte, has been lost to the present generation, which cannot conceive anything higher than infinite "fine reflections" and "beautiful thoughts," and stands aghast at the possibility of a science which proposes to cut off all those infinite reflections and thoughts in their very root, by establishing a universally valid system of all reason.

By the student of Kant, however, it must be borne in mind, that in his days the word Philosophy did stand for such a closed science, and not for infinite reflections. The neglect to remember this has been one of the reasons why Kant has been so woefully misunderstood. He does not intend to be a mere arguer and setter forth of opinions—at least, not in his works of pure philosophy—but the teacher of a specific science; indeed, of the Science of all Sciences. There are two other reasons why Kant has been so lamentably misrepresented, more particularly in English literature; the first one being, that the English translations of his Critic of Pure Reason suffer from serious defects; and the second one, that only this Critic

has been translated, whereas the other two Critics constitute equally important parts of Kant's system. Concerning the latter subject, however, Kant himself may deserve some censure in that he named his first Critic "The Critic of *Pure Reason*," thereby suggesting it to constitute the whole of his system, whereas he should have published his whole system under the general title: Critic of Pure Reason; with the three subdivisions—Critic of Theoretical Reason, Critic of Practical Reason, and Critic of the Power of Judgment. That he did not do this happened probably because the full conception of his system was not in Kant's mind when he set out upon his work; or because the word Reason was not taken by him at first as involving all the faculties of the Ego. For the Ego is not merely a power of theoretical cognition, which power alone is treated of in the Critic of Pure Reason; it is also a power of practical acting or willing, and finally a power of relating its cognitions to its willing, or a power of judgment. But if the full conception of his work was not thus clear in Kant's mind at the outset, it certainly became so at the end, when he wrote his Preface to the Critic of the Power of Judgment, wherein he not only develops this triplicity in the Ego, but moreover assigns its ground; which ground is, that every synthetic science must necessarily treat, 1st, of the Condition; 2d, of the Conditioned; and 3d, of the Conception which results from the union of the Conditioned with its Condition.

It is, however, to be remembered, that the latter part as connecting with the first two parts, need not be separately treated in an artistic representation of the whole Science of Reason, but may—and perhaps with better effect—be treated along with those first two parts. Kant, indeed, suggests this course to the future completer of his system, and Fichte, in dividing his Science of Knowledge, followed Kant's advice. In the Science of Knowledge there are only two parts: the theoretical (Critic of Pure Reason), and the practical (Critic of Practical Reason); the Critic of the Power of Judgment being divided, in its fundamental principles, between the two parts.

The great discovery which led Kant to undertake the immense labor of gathering all the material for a complete system of reason, and which initiates one of the most momentous epochs in the development of our race, was this: that a

Science of Philosophy could not be possible as a Science of so-called Metaphysics, but only as a Science of Reason or Knowledge; and that hence the Science of Metaphysics, in so far as it pretended to furnish theoretical cognitions of supersensuous objects, dwelt in an utter illusion; the only supersensuous cognitions possible being cognitions of cognition itself. Hence his two problems were:

1. To prove an absolute Science of Reason possible.
2. To prove a Science of Metaphysics impossible.

It was owing to this twofold, and, at first glance, apparently contradictory object of his labors, that Kant was so generally charged with doublesidedness and contradiction. His critics could not understand how the same man could be so zealous in pleading the *a priori* absoluteness of the categories, and so earnest in overthrowing all theoretical proofs of God, Freedom, and Immortality. The theological arguers grew wrathful because he destroyed their proofs of those three principles; while materialistic arguers were equally indignant because he demonstrated, that knowledge would not be at all possible unless we had absolute *a priori* knowledge.

Probably every reader of the Critic of Pure Reason has, at the first reading, been struck by a difference even of tone between the first two books and the third book of that work. The cause of that difference arises precisely from the reason stated. In the first two books, wherein the two questions—How is a science of pure mathematics possible? and, How is a science of pure physics possible?—are investigated, the answer runs: they are absolutely possible; for if we had not *a priori* contemplations of time and space wherein to place our sensations, and *a priori* conceptions of the forms of relations whereby to relate and connect those sensations, experience would be impossible. In forcibly insisting upon the absolute character of those contemplations, as well as of the forms of relation or categories, Kant appears as an unwavering idealist, who bases all knowledge upon the Ego, and shows that, unless it were so based, knowledge itself would be impossible. The very character of the proof required, namely, a positive character, gives to Kant's language, throughout these two books, an energy and vehemence of conviction which is strikingly in contrast with the style of the third book.

In that third book Kant answers the third of the three questions whereinto the fundamental question of a Science of Reason—How are synthetical cognitions *a priori* possible?—had been shown to separate. That third question was: How is a Science of Metaphysics possible? Now, as a Science of Metaphysics meant, in Kant's time, a science of supersensuous objects—that is, of God, Freedom, and Immortality—and not a Science of Knowledge, Kant's proof in this book had to be negative, and moreover partly qualified, which naturally gave a less decided character to the style. That answer, it will be remembered, runs: precisely because we could have no experience (empirical knowledge) unless we had *a priori* absolute contemplations of time and space, and *a priori* absolute forms of relation whereby to connect the objects in those contemplations, can we have no experience of any objects not determined by those contemplations and categories. Hence theoretical cognition of God, Freedom, and Immortality, is a contradiction and impossible. In uncompromisingly insisting on this impossibility—though suggesting another mode of cognition for those objects—Kant appeared to many a rooted realist, if not materialist, who denied the possibility of any cognition not grounded in sensation. Now, it must be confessed, that in so far as Kant, in his Critic of Pure Reason, had never touched upon the origin of the *sensations* in the Ego, the Ego throughout that Critic appeared to that extent dependent upon a foreign Other, which gave it the sensations; which foreign Other the last named class of Kant's opponents concluded to be Matter; but as Kant had been careful not to touch that question at all, as not belonging to the Critic of Theoretical Reason, there was no warrant for such an inference.

The ground for the mistake has already been mentioned. The Critic of Pure Reason investigates merely the power of theoretical reason, or of cognition through the intellect. Hence the question where the intellect gets the sensations which it casts outside of itself, and objectivates in time and space, is not considered in it. These sensations are assumed as given; and an investigation of theoretical reason shows merely that reason furnishes out of itself the forms under which it knows of these sensations. In short, the theoretical faculty appears

to be legislative and absolute only in so far as it prescribes to itself the rules under which alone it can take knowledge of the manifold in time and space; that is, it is only *formally* absolute; but in so far as that manifold is not shown to be *produced* by the intelligence, the theoretical faculty appears dependent upon a Given, a foreign Other, a Non-Ego. In the merely theoretical part of a Science of Reason the Ego posits itself as only *formally* self-determined, and as *actually* limited by a Non-Ego.

It is one of the most difficult problems in philosophy to make the full significance of this result clear to the student, or to show that the merely theoretical intellect cannot do otherwise than posit itself as limited. It seems so contradictory that the intellect should posit itself (by an absolute free act) and yet posit itself as dependent. The solution is, that we call the theoretical faculty of the Ego that faculty which cognizes under the forms of time and space and the categories. Hence it comprehends only by means of the causality-relation; and on that very account it can never rise to the conception of any first cause or origin, becoming self-contradictory and absurd when trying to do so.*

Hence, even when thinking itself, the theoretical faculty cannot think itself otherwise than as already determined; and applying the causality relation to this determinedness, it necessarily posits an Other, a Non-Ego, as the ground thereof. At the same time the Ego can know of this its necessary procedure, can know that it does so and why it must do so, and through this knowledge, therefore, can rid itself of that dependency. This, however, is only an ideal riddance, and furnishes only the conception of *negative Freedom*; while practically the Ego remains dependent. Every system, indeed, which views the Ego as merely a theoretical faculty, as merely a thinking power, must necessarily teach the dependency of the

* It is astonishing that sensible men should still continue to search for the origin of the world, the origin of man, and the origin of language, as if those problems were not by their very nature removed from search; and it is still more astonishing that this search should be kept up chiefly by men who scoff at transcendental philosophy. Transcendental philosophy has never been guilty of such a transcending of the limits of reason; nor, indeed, of such unwarranted metaphysical speculations as crowd the writings of men like Comte, Mill, Herbert Spencer, Muxley, Vogt, Moleschott, and Buechner.

Ego. Spinoza's system* is the most illustrious example, and is, indeed, the offspring of that view. Kant's Critic of Pure Reason, although it also shows that the Ego must think itself as dependent upon a Non-Ego, partly removes that dependency, as we have seen, by showing it to be simply the result of the Ego's own laws of thinking. Partly, but not wholly; nor could the difficulty ever be wholly removed were the Ego a mere power of thinking.

But the Ego is not only a power of theoretical cognition; it is moreover a power of practical acting, and in so far an actual determining of the Non-Ego, provided this acting may be viewed as simply the self-determination of the Ego. Upon this question hinges, indeed, the whole sanctity and absoluteness of reason, and the possibility of a Science of Practical Reason. Should this question be answered in the affirmative, the Ego would no longer determine the Non-Ego merely ideally, but likewise really—although it might appear that the latter determining could never be completed in any time.

As the Critic of Pure Reason had for its chief problem the question: How are synthetical *cognitions a priori* possible? so the Critic of Practical Reason must propose to itself the question: How are synthetical *principles a priori* possible? Or, since practical principles involve in Kant's terminology two classes of rules, whereof he calls the one that announces a determination of the will, which is valid only for the will of the *subject*, Maxims, and the other, which are recognized as valid for the will of *all* rational beings, Laws—How are synthetical practical *laws a priori* possible?

Now it is clear that no practical law of rational activity can

* Spinoza's system is merely the Theoretical Part of the Science of Knowledge; and it is because his system lacks the Practical Part that it is one-sided. In his system the Ego, therefore, posits itself as dependent upon an unknown Non-Ego, which Spinoza sometimes calls God, and at other times Nature or Substance. His system is the most logical development of that view, as Fichte already observed; and every system which holds the Ego to be merely a power of thinking must lapse into Spinozism. There is in his system neither positive freedom, nor free design; his Ethics is, indeed, the saddest book ever written; blind fatality rules everywhere. Jacobi, in his famous writings on Spinoza, took particular pains to show that all speculative reasoning must lead to Spinoza's results; and, in so far as he understood reason to signify merely the power of thinking, he was correct enough; but Kant first, and Fichte after him, showed that the practical power of the Ego is even superior to the ground of its theoretical function.

be *objectively* valid, i. e. valid for all rational beings, and can therefore be known to be the result of absolute self-determination, unless it is in the form of an *Imperative* (of a *Shall*); that is, unless it is not the product of self-conscious reason as a general rule of action; for such a rule applies merely to the subject which produces it in so far as it suits its own subjective inclinations: whereas Imperatives are characterized by an objective compulsion, and signify that the reason which utters them would without fail act them out if reason alone determined the will. But to be objectively valid, practical laws must be not only in the form of an Imperative; this Imperative must, moreover, be unconditioned or categorical. For if the Imperative addressed itself to the will not simply as will, but conditionally, or subject to the possibility whether the will *can* execute the Imperative or not: they would not be necessarily *valid*, but made dependent upon pathological facts.

All those practical principles, therefore, which presuppose an object of desire as determining the will, can never rise to the dignity of objectively valid laws, being firstly empirical, and secondly valid only for the subject; and since ALL *material* practical principles do presuppose an object of desire as determining the will, or since they all rest upon self-love or pursuit of happiness, it is evident that practical laws or categorical Imperatives, if at all possible, must be purely *formal* laws; that is, that they can involve only in *form* the ground of determination of the will.

At this result Kant, in his Critic of Practical Reason, pauses a while to demonstrate at length that *all* material practical rules of action presuppose an object of desire so determining the will, and hence are all based on selfishness; and to indulge in a polemic against those who think that they can arrive at moral laws by discriminating in the character of the desire which determines the will in such cases. Kant shows, that whether this desire arises from an enjoyment which we expect to derive through the senses, or from one which we expect to obtain through the understanding, does not at all change the fact, that in all such cases we are merely impelled by a desire for pleasure. We may justly enough call some pleasures coarser and some finer; "but on that account to say that the

latter constitute a mode of determining the will otherwise than through the senses, when they presuppose for their possibility a capacity for such pleasures in us, is just as absurd as when ignoramuses, who like to dabble in metaphysics, think of matter so fine, so superfine, that they get dizzy in their poor heads, and then believe that so doing they have thought a *spiritual*, and yet also *extended* Being."

The problem, therefore, is to discover a will which may be determinable by the mere *form* of a law. Now such a form of a law is clearly a pure thought of reason, and in no manner whatever an object of the senses or an appearance. Hence it is also not thought to be subject to any of the categories that apply to the world of appearances, and can in no manner be thought as determining the will in the same way as the law of causality is thought as determining objects in the world of nature. For under the law of causality the determining ground is always itself again thought as determined by a previous determining ground, and so on *ad infinitum*. It is evident, therefore, that the will, which is to be discovered, must be thought—if it is to be thought as determined solely by this form of a law—as altogether independent of the world of causality which rules in nature. Such independence is called freedom, and a will which is determinable only by the form of a law will therefore show itself to be, if we succeed in finding it, a *free* will. Can we, then, find a free will determined solely by the form of a law?

Now the important point here is to confess that the answer to this question cannot be demonstrated theoretically, just as little as you can demonstrate to anyone that he is an intelligent being: each one must look into himself and find whether or not he discovers such a will there. Meanwhile Kant asserts that it is in every rational being, and that its determination through the form of a law is known in language as the Moral Law. But this can be shown: that if there does occur in rational consciousness such a fact as Moral Law, then that Moral Law is identical with freedom, i. e. with positive freedom, and in fact is nothing but the Absoluteness and Self-determination of Reason in general or of the Ego. For we cannot obtain knowledge of positive freedom—as distinguished from that negative freedom which is merely an independence

of determinations of nature, and which certainly arises in immediate consciousness—in any immediate manner, such immediate consciousness being able to express only negative freedom; nor through external cognitions, since these are all subsumable under the conception of causality and mechanism; and hence we should have no way of arriving at the conception of a positive freedom did there not occur within our consciousness the phenomenon of a command—Thou shalt?—utterly opposed to and overthrowing the determinations of our nature. It is, therefore, only through the occurring of this phenomenon that human reason has ever been impelled to consider the conception of positive freedom; and he who has but once experienced that the command, *Thou shalt*, or *Thou shalt not*, does utterly override all the impulses of his nature, has thereby become conscious of absolute freedom, and proved to himself that there does occur in the Ego a power of determining the Non-Ego, and hence has proved to himself the absoluteness and self-sufficiency of the Ego. Moral Law, therefore, or conscience, or the inner voice of God—whatever it may be called—is nothing but the manifestating and realizing itself of the absolute self-determination of the Ego; and that absolute self-determination or self-sufficiency is nothing but the Moral Law or positive freedom.

The first section of the Analytic of Practical Reason having thus shown that pure reason is practical, or can absolutely determine the will—which proof it has furnished by the fact of the occurrence of the Moral Law in us, which is inseparable from, nay, identical with the consciousness of freedom—that section seems utterly to overthrow the result of the Critic of Pure Reason, that we can have knowledge only of a world of internal perception, and that we are, in all our knowledge of it, determined by it. Hence this fact, which everyone can verify for himself, furnishes us the strange manifestation of a world determined by reason alone, existing together with a world determining reason: a moral world and a world of nature; a world of freedom and a world of mechanism; a *natura archetypa* and a *natura ectypa*!

Now this is certainly calculated to shock one at the first glance; for what are we to place trust in? The *fact* which asserts a Moral Law, but confesses the impossibility theoreti-

cally to explain it, or the *theoretical faculty* which we accept as our guide in all other matters, but which declares itself impotent to explain a fact which forces itself upon us every moment of the day.

This duplicity in human reason is developed quite at length by Kant in two appendices to the first section of the *Analytic*, headed "Concerning the Deduction of the Principles of Practical Reason" and "Concerning the right of Pure Reason in its practical function to an extension which is not permitted in its speculative function."

The grounds of this duplicity we have already shown as in its very root the impossibility of the Ego in its theoretical function to do otherwise than apply the laws of that function (and hence the causality-relation); from which impossibility it results that the Ego cannot *in reflection* posit even itself free. The Ego can only *be* free; but the moment it reflects upon its freedom, its freedom is again thought under the laws of reflection—that is, under the causality-relation—and hence as not freedom.

By this insight the great difficulty in the way of demonstrating real freedom is removed. For when it has been shown, that the fact of an absolute impulse in reason to determine itself cannot be theoretically proved from the very nature of the case, no one can require anything more than to experience the fact in himself, and cannot ask for a theoretical proof without stultifying himself. The impulse would not be an absolute impulse, and hence the freedom would not be true freedom if it could be demonstrated.

Thus the very impossibility of a theoretical proof turns out to be, after all, merely the result of the supremacy of the practical power. The Ego in its fundamental essence is not a thinking, but an acting power; not theoretical, but moral; not limited, but absolute; and all its limitedness is simply the result of the theoretical faculty of the Ego, which requires that this acting shall become visible to itself. All limitedness is the result of reflection, of a making-clear-unto-itself. Originally the whole activity of the Ego extends into the Infinite; but because this activity is not to be a mere appearing of the Ego, but is to be such an appearing of the Ego *for the Ego itself*, it is reflected back, checked, and is a Non-Ego posited as the

ground of that check. To ask that this duplicity of reason should be removed, is to ask that reason should cease to be reason; for it cannot be reason unless it is an acting, and it cannot be an acting *for itself* unless its acting is checked and the check ascribed to something not itself.

By showing, therefore, in consciousness the fact of a Moral Law, we obtain the practical certainty of freedom; as by demonstrating that the Ego posits the causality-relation between itself and the Non-Ego, and thus makes itself dependent upon the latter merely by virtue of its own laws of thinking, we rise to the comprehension of its ideal freedom.

The result of the investigation undertaken in the first section of the Critic of Practical Reason may, therefore, be popularly summed up as follows:—There appears in all finite reason an impulse to act in a certain manner altogether independent of any external purpose or motive, and merely for the sake of such acting, and this impulse is called the Moral Law. It is a determinedness of freedom: freedom determined by its own absoluteness, and may be put in a formula as follows:

Act in such a manner that the maxim of your will can be valid always as the principle of a universal legislation.

For this formula expresses the form of a law, and the only possible form of a law which can be thought as determining the will of all rational beings absolutely, and which has therefore the same validity for practical reason as the categories have for theoretical reason; since to act so that the maxim of my will can be always valid as principle of a universal legislation, means simply to act in obedience to an *absolute* form of a law, or an absolute impulse.

In the second section of the Analytic of Practical Reason, "Concerning the Conception of an Object of Practical Reason," Kant renews the proof of the absolute fact of the Moral Law in all rational beings by showing that the conceptions of the only two possible objects of practical reason—namely, the Good and the Bad*—far from determining in our mind the Moral Law, rather are determined by it, and could not possibly arise in our mind except through the conception of that

* The German words *das Gute* and *das Boese* express much more unambiguously the purely moral character of the two conceptions for which they stand.

Law. For if the conception of Good, for instance, were not determined by the absolutely *a priori* Moral Law, it could arise only through comparison with a feeling (of pleasure or pain) in us, and hence the conception of Good could not be in the nature of a universally valid law, but merely of a practical rule to promote our happiness; a rule which would differ in every individual and change according to external circumstances, so that it could never be foreknown.

The fact, therefore, that there are such conceptions as those of Good and Bad as distinctively moral conceptions, which have no reference to empirical feelings of pleasure and pain, gives additional proof to the *a priori* character of the Moral Law; and these conceptions having been established as the only possible objects of practical reason, there remains merely the question: how the Moral Law as a law of freedom can possibly become applicable in a world which stands under the law of causality and mechanism. It will be noticed that the difficulty is of the same nature as one that occurs in the Critic of Pure Reason, where we have pure *a priori* conceptions, and cannot at first see how they, as altogether supersensuous can possibly become relatable to a manifold of empirical objects; a difficulty which is removed by showing that all sensations of empirical objects are after all given to reason (as schemes) in the two likewise *a priori* forms of contemplation: time and space.

But, in the present case, the objects of practical reason, the Good and the Bad, cannot be made relatable to the supersensuous *will* by means of contemplation, since they do not enter the form of contemplation. Nevertheless—precisely because, in the present case, it is a relation to a *will* and not to a power of cognition—the application can be made possible. Not, however, by means of a scheme of sensuousness, but by a law. In short: the supersensuous will can apply the Moral Law in a world of mechanism by subsuming the conception of that law under that of the law of causality, which rules in the sensuous world, and thus by changing the formula of the Moral Law into the following:

Act in such a manner that if that act should occur through a law of nature you could look upon it as possible through your will.

This formula Kant calls the *Typus* of the Moral Law—the universality and absoluteness of the law of causality in the natural world typifying the universality and absoluteness of the Moral Law in the supersensuous world;—and this *Typus* is quite proper so long as we transfer merely the *form of lawfulness*, and not its sensuous contemplations, from the world of nature to the Moral World.

Having thus established in the first section of the Analytic the general principle of the Moral Law, in the second section the objects of that principle, and in the third the possibility of applying that principle to those objects in a sensuous world, Kant in the concluding section treats of the relation of practical reason to sensuousness, and of its necessary, *a priori* cognizable influence upon it. The beauty of Kant's *style*—which has so unjustly been condemned as rough, intricate, heavy and unartistic, whereas it is generally of wonderful clearness and finish—finds here occasion to develop his most heartfelt convictions, highest emotions, and noblest aspirations; giving proof, if any were needed, that the Critic of Practical Reason was written by him not as a concession to popular prejudice, but rather with more enthusiasm and interest than the Critic of Pure Reason. Characterizing the nature of that influence as reverence, Kant thus speaks of it:—"Reverence always relates to persons, never to things. The latter may inspire *affection*; and in the case of animals, as horses, dogs, &c., even *love*; or *fear*, as in the sea, volcanoes, &c.; but never *reverence*.... A man also may be the object of love, of fear, or of admiration, even to a high degree, and yet he may not be to me an object of reverence.... Fontenelle says: 'I bow down before a noble, but my spirit does not bow down'; and I add: but my spirit does bow down before a common citizen in whom I perceive honesty of character to a greater degree than I am conscious of possessing myself; and my spirit does so bow down whether I will or not, and however high I carry my head in order to show him my superior rank."

"Far from being a feeling of enjoyment, reverence is rather a feeling to which we submit very unwillingly in respect to another person. We always try to discover something which might diminish this feeling in us, some kind of fault to hold us harmless against the humiliation which such an example

inflicts upon us. Even the dead, particularly if their example appears to be beyond our reach, are not always secure against this criticism. Nay, the very Moral Law itself, in its solemn majesty, is exposed to this tendency in man to escape the reverence it compels. Or, why that constant desire to drag it down to the level of an ordinary inclination, and that persistent endeavor to make it a favorite prescription for our own advantage and enjoyment, unless it is to escape that terrifying reverence which holds up to us so severely our own unworthiness? Yet again there is so little of disagreeableness in the feeling, that, if we have once thrown aside our self-merit and have admitted that reverence to practical influence upon us, we can never get satiated with the glory of this law; and our soul seems to elevate itself in the same degree as it sees this holy law elevated above itself and its sinful nature."

That this feeling of reverence is *a priori* cognizable Kant establishes by showing that the Moral Law is a restriction upon all our inclinations, our self-esteem included, by the condition of obedience to that law; and that hence it would be merely of a negative nature and humiliating for our sensuous character were it not at the same time elevating for our moral nature. As such a positive influence, Kant calls reverence the *incentive* of pure practical reason, which incentive awakens gradually a moral *interest*, and finally leads to the establishing of moral *maxims*.

The act which that Moral Law prompts, Kant calls Duty. Being prompted purely by that law, exclusive of all motives of inclination, this Duty involves in its conception practical compulsion; that is, a determination to act, however disagreeable it may be to us. The feeling which arises from this consciousness of compulsion is not pathological, but altogether practical, and hence as submission under a compulsory law, far from being accompanied by pleasure, is rather accompanied by aversion; but at the same time, precisely because it is a compulsion of our own *reason*, independent of all external motives and incentives, does it also elevate us in our feeling, in which shape we call that feeling self-approval or self-reverence; and it is of the greatest importance to remember that in finite rational beings the Moral Law always must assume this shape of compulsion, and that the Holiness of

Will, which implies a perfect harmony between the Moral Law and the Will, and hence no compulsion, can never be reached by us. Kant loses no occasion to insist that this conception of Duty must be held in its strict purity as an absolute compulsion, and that it is both absurd and harmful, as leading to *Schwaermerei*,* to teach that morality ought to be practised for the love of it. It is absurd to require love for a command, and it is harmful to mix up a pathological affection with the highest manifestation of reason, with that which has its ground in absolute freedom and independence from the mechanism of nature: duty for the mere sake of duty! "The venerable character of duty has nothing to do with the enjoyment of life; it has its own peculiar law and its own peculiar tribunal. Nay, even if we should try ever so much to mix both together like medicines, in order to give the draught thus mixed to the sick soul, they yet will immediately separate of themselves; and if they do not separate, then the former will not operate at all. But even if physical life should gain some strength by this mixture, moral life would die out beyond redemption."

ANALYSIS OF HEGEL'S *ÆSTHETICS*.

Translated from the French of M. Ch. Bénard, by J. A. MARSH.

II. We understand the nature of poetry in general and that of the poetic thought, the characteristics which distinguish the works of poetry from other productions of the human intelligence. We must now approach the questions relating to *expression* or to *poetic language*. This subject, which occupies so much space in ordinary treatises upon poetry, should not be neglected in a philosophic theory. Hegel bestows upon it all the attention which it merits. Without entering into the technical details of a treatise on versification, he seeks to give an account of the necessity of poetic language and of its forms, and proceeds then to a learned analysis of

* Carlyle has done little service to an introduction of this word into the English language by giving *Swarmery* as its equivalent. *Schwaermerei* is a transcending of the limits of reason practised on principle.